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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Petitioner appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction
relief after an evidentiary hearing following a remand from the Court of Appeals
on one issue: whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his
attorney failed to object (or move for a mistrial) to a witness testifying Petitioner
had attempted to rape the witness’ wife.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
While there was a jury trial in the underlying criminal case, the most
concise description of the unusual set of facts appears as the official version in
the PSI which recites the Minidoka County Affidavit of Probable Cause:
On November 23, 2011, at 9:38 P.M., Detective Lowder received a
call from dispatch requesting that he respond to Wal-Mart, 385 N.
Overland, Burley, Idaho, for a robbery that had just occurred.
Detective Lowder was informed that he needed to contact Deputy
Moore via phone while he was in route. Deputy Moore advised
Detective Lowder that the suspect later identified as Robert
Lambert entered Wal-Mart and attempted to take money from the
store. After taking a cart containing money from the clerk Robert
attempted to leave the store and was subdued by citizens in the
south door exit area. The citizens held Robert on the ground until
law enforcement arrived and took custody of him.
In viewing and collecting video of the incident, in the surveillance
room at Wal-Mart, it shows Robert at the south side of the parking
lot in a white car. It also shows a second male, later identified as
Tommy Nash, who comes and goes from the car into Wal-Mart.
Robert walks around the area of the car for a short time and then
puts on a mask/hood and enters the store. Mitchell enters the store
about thirty seconds behind Robert. Robert then approaches the
clerk collecting the money and pushes one of them away from the
cart and takes the cart. He runs towards the south doors where he
collides with a grocery car with an infant child in it. The father of the
child and another shopper grab Robert and a scuffle takes place.
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He is taken to the ground by the shoppers and held until law
enforcement arrive.
While Robert is being subdued by the shoppers the video also
shows Tommy move the car from the parking stall and parks it in
front of the south doors. Tommy exits the car, walks around the
back of the car, and then opens the right rear door. Tommy walks
towards the doors of the store and peers in while Robert is being
restrained. Tommy then walks back to the car, closes the rear door,
gets back in the car and drives away.
After concluding his investigation at Wal-Mart, Detective Lowder
met with Robert Lambert at the Mini-Cassia Criminal Justice
Center. Robert advised Detective Lowder that he met Tommy Nash
while he was in the Mesa County Jail in Colorado. He said they
bonded out at the same time and hung around for awhile. He said
they traveled to Salt Lake City, Utah, and stayed with a friend for a
couple of days. They then traveled to Burley and stayed with Uncle
Lenny. Robert said while they were there they made a plan to rob
Wal-Mart. Robert advised Detective Lowder of a third person,
Mitchell Bias, that was involved in planning and committing the
robbery. Robert stated that he communicated with Mitchell, via cell
phone, until the battery on his phone died. Robert further advised
Mitchell was suppose to run block for them (Tommy and Robert) so
they could get away. Robert said they were going to meet later and
get rid of the car he and Tommy were driving, and leave with
Mitchell.
Detective Lowder obtained search warrants for the phones that
Robert, Mitchell, and Tommy were using on the night of the robbery
so he could get the phone records associated with them. In
reviewing the phone records Detective Lowder made a list of the
phone calls between Mitchell, Tommy, and Robert on 11/23/2011
from 1855 hours until 2154 hours. The phone records show that
Mitchell called Robert thirteen times and he called Tommy eight
times in this time frame. In the same time frame Robert called
Mitchell nine times and he called Tommy one time. In the same
time frame Tommy called Mitchell one time and he called Robert
four times. There were a total of 35 phone calls made between
Mitchell, Tommy, and Robert between 1855 hours and 2154 hours.
In viewing the video from Wal-Mart it shows Mitchell came into
camera view from the inside of the store within a minute of Robert
being taken down by the store patrons. Mitchell stands next to the
shoppers and pulls his phone from his pocket. Mitchell does make
two phone calls to 911 and one phone call to Robert, whom he is
2

now helping to detain. After Robert is taken from the store by law
enforcement Mitchell calls Robert two more times. Mitchell then
calls Tommy four times, then calls Robert again, and then calls
Tommy two more times.
PSI, p. 4-5.1
After a jury trial, Mr. Bias was found guilty of conspiracy with the object of
committing robbery and burglary.
with the first two years fixed.

He was sentenced to eight years in prison
He filed a direct appeal through appointed

appellate counsel, arguing only that his sentence was excessive. The Court of
Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. State v. Bias, docket no. 40870
(Ct.App. 2014, unpublished).
Mr. Bias filed a timely verified pro se petition for post-conviction relief with
affidavit of facts, which asserted, inter alia, ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Ultimately, the court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment in a
written decision. Mr. Bias appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the
summary dismissal as to one issue. Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696 (Ct.App. 2015).
The matter was remanded back to the district court and an evidentiary
hearing on the one issue was held. (R. p. 58-62.) Post hearing briefing followed
after which the district court denied post-conviction relief and issued an order
containing its findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R. p. 75-91.) A written
judgment was also filed. (R. p. 92-93.)
Mr. Bias filed a timely notice of appeal. (R. p. 94-96.)

The PSI was submitted as a confidential exhibit in Supreme Court docket no.
42498 (the previous post conviction appeal), of which Appellant is
contemporaneously moving this Court to take judicial notice.
1
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ISSUE
Whether the district court erred when it denied post-conviction relief following an
evidentiary hearing, rejecting Petitioner’s assertion that he had received
ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney’s failure to object (or move
for mistrial) to a witness’ claim that Petitioner had attempted to rape the witness’
wife.
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ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF DUE TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BECAUSE
PETITIONER’S ATTORNEY FAILED TO OBJECT TO (OR MOVE FOR
MISTRIAL) A WITNESS’ CLAIM THAT PETITIONER HAD ATTEMPTED TO
RAPE THE WITNESS’ WIFE
A.

Standard of Review at Trial and on Appeal
The relevant standards were comprehensively explained in Medina v.

State, 132 Idaho 722, 979 P.2d 124 (Ct.App. 1999):
In order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the applicant
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the allegations
upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. Follinus
v. State, 127 Idaho 897, 908 P.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1995); see also
I.C. § 19-4907 (stating that all rules and statutes applicable in civil
proceedings are available to the parties in a postconviction relief
case). Once the district court has denied or granted the post
conviction application following a hearing, the evidence must be
viewed most favorably to the trial court's findings. Reynolds v.
State, 126 Idaho 24, 28, 878 P.2d 198, 202 (Ct. App. 1994).
The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their
testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all
matters solely within the province of the district court. Larkin v.
State, 115 Idaho 72, 764 P.2d 439 (Ct. App. 1988). On appeal,
findings of fact made by the trial court shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52 (a); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65,
794 P.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1990). Findings supported by competent
and substantial evidence produced at the hearing will not be
disturbed. Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 711, 905 P.2d 642,
644 (Ct. App. 1995). However, this Court freely reviews the legal
conclusions drawn by the trial court from the facts found. Id.
Id. at p. 724-725.
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B.

Standard of Review Regarding a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel
The standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is

well established, being set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984).

The "benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be

whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just
result." Id. at 686.
Strickland set forth a two-prong test which a defendant must satisfy in
order to be entitled to relief. The defendant must demonstrate both that his
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of
the proceedings would have been different. Id. at 687-88; State v. Charboneau,
116 Idaho 129 (1989); Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631 (1986).

C.

The Evidentiary Hearing and the Court’s Rulings
The background of the claim is explained in the Court of Appeals

published opinion in the original appeal of the dismissal of the post-conviction
petition, Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696 (Ct.App. 2015):
(b) Testimony of attempted rape
Bias next contends that his trial counsel was deficient in failing to
object to, move for a mistrial after, or move to strike Lambert's
testimony that Bias had raped or attempted to rape M.L. Bias
argues that this testimonial evidence, offered in his trial for
conspiracy to commit robbery and burglary, would have been
inadmissible. In dismissing the claims surrounding the challenged
6

testimony, the district court ruled that Bias did not present
admissible evidence to support his "bare and conclusory" claims.
To justify an evidentiary hearing, a petitioner must provide factual
evidence that would be admissible at the hearing. Baldwin v. State,
145 Idaho 148, 155, 177 P.3d 362, 369 (2008). A petitioner's
factual allegations that are based upon personal knowledge are
admissible when presented through a verified petition or a
notarized affidavit. See id. In his verified petition and notarized
affidavits, Bias attested to the substance of Lambert's trial
testimony. Specifically, Bias stated "that my Trial counsel failed to
object to Robert Lambert's statement at Trial concerning me
attempting
to
rape
[M.L.]"
and
that
"such
an
inflammatory statement" "was highly prejudicial." The fact that the
statement was made and that trial counsel did not object would be
admissible at the hearing, as the facts were within Bias's personal
knowledge and sufficiently attested to through sworn documents.
Bias has presented admissible evidence in support of his ineffective
assistance claim. Therefore, we turn to whether such evidence was
sufficient to establish a prima facie case satisfying both prongs of
the Strickland test.
Regarding the first prong of the Strickland analysis, counsel's
failure to object to inadmissible evidence may constitute deficient
performance. State v. Pugsley, 128 Idaho 168, 175, 911 P.2d 761,
768 (Ct. App. 1995). Therefore, this Court must first determine
whether the evidence was inadmissible. Lambert's trial testimony
implicates Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) as evidence of other bad
acts. I.R.E. 404(b). In determining the admissibility of evidence of
other bad acts, the Supreme Court utilizes a two-tiered analysis.
State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185, 1188 (2009). The
first tier requires finding (1) sufficient evidence to establish the prior
bad act as fact; and (2) that the prior bad act is relevant to a
material disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than
propensity. Id. The State does not argue, nor does the record
support finding, that testimony regarding a rape or attempted rape
was relevant to a material disputed issue concerning Bias's charge
of conspiracy to commit robbery and burglary. Because the first tier
is dispositive, we need not address the second tier. Thus, this
testimony was likely inadmissible under Rule 404(b).
Regarding the second prong of the Strickland analysis, Bias must
still show that he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's
deficiency. Sheahan, 146 Idaho at 105, 190 P.3d at 924. In his
petition, Bias contended that the statement "was highly prejudicial"
and "inflammatory." We agree, as we have previously held that
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I.R.E. 404(b) evidence is inherently prejudicial. See, e.g., State v.
Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 221, 207 P.3d 186, 197 (Ct. App. 2009).
Therefore, we conclude that Bias's pleadings and arguments were
sufficient to raise a genuine issue as to whether trial counsel's
failure to object or move for a mistrial after Lambert's statements
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court
erred in summarily dismissing this claim.
Id., p. 704.
The Court of Appeals then remanded the case to the district court for an
evidentiary hearing. Id., p. 707.
The district court’s characterization of the claim, as it appears in its
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (hereinafter Order), is as follows:
The defense strategy in the underlying criminal trial was that Robert
Lambert had set up the petitioner for this crime in part because the
defendant had an affair with Monica Lambert, the
wife of Robert Lambert. This was made clear in defense counsel's
opening statement. There was testimony of an affair offered in the
defense's case and it was alluded to in the defense's crossexamination of Robert Lambert. During the cross-examination of
Robert Lambert, defense counsel inquired of Mr. Lambert as to his
knowledge of an affair between Monica and Mitchell
Bias, of which Mr. Lambert denied having any knowledge. On redirect by the State the following colloquy occurred between the
prosecutor and Mr. Lambert:
Q: I have to touch on this. You said with assuredy {sic}--And
the reason I'm touching on this is because defense counsel
brought it up. But you said with assuredy {sic} that you
know that Monica never had had an affair with Mitch. Why
do you say that so surely?
A: Because she can't stand him like that. He tried to rape
her when they first met.
The defense also called other witnesses to convince the jury that
the defendant had an affair with Monica Lambert.
Order, p. 2-3.(R. p. 76-77.)
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The district court took judicial notice of the trial transcript from the criminal
case. (R. p. 78.)

It then described the evidence adduced at the evidentiary

hearing, which was that of the Petitioner, his trial counsel, and the prosecutor.
(Id.) First, Petitioner’s testimony was described:
Mitchell Bias:
Mr. Bias testified about the trial in the underlying proceeding,
particularly in regard to the statement Robert Lambert made about
the petitioner trying to rape Monica Lambert. The petitioner testified
that he discussed the statement with his counsel, McCord Larsen,
at the time it was made, but Mr. Larsen did not object to the
statement. The petitioner claims that he asked Mr.
Larsen to do something about the statement, but Mr. Larsen blew
him off, played stupid, and said that it would not matter. The
petitioner claims that Mr. Larsen did not explain or discuss the
actions they could have taken or made in response to the
statement.
On cross-examination by counsel for the respondent, the petitioner
claimed that during trial Mr. Larsen did not object to the witness's
statement because the prosecutor on the case, Lance Stevenson,
had threatened him. The petitioner alleged that Mr. Larsen had
applied for a job with Mr. Stevenson's office and Mr. Stevenson had
directed Mr. Larsen to ''play dumb" during the criminal trial.
On redirect by counsel for the petitioner the petitioner discussed
Mr. Larsen's trial strategy. The petitioner noted Mr. Larsen's failure
to subpoena many of the witnesses that he wanted to testify, some
of whom were character witnesses and one of which was Monica
Lambert. The court questioned the petitioner regarding Mr. Larsen's
trial strategy and the petitioner agreed that there was supposed to
be a trial strategy to demonstrate that the relationship between the
petitioner and Ms. Lambert was a motivation for Mr. Lambert to be
untruthful. The petitioner noted that he and Mr. Larsen discussed
that trial strategy, but that Ms. Lambert was never subpoenaed.
Order, p. 4-5. (R. 78-79.)
The order then described the testimony of appointed defense counsel:
McCord Larsen:
Mr. Larsen testified that, at the time of the petitioner's criminal trial,
he was a conflict public defender in Minidoka County. He was
9

appointed to represent Mr. Bias in November of 2012. Mr. Larsen
noted that there were multiple witnesses he was never able to find
during the petitioner's case. Mr. Larsen testified that his theory of
the case was that Robert Lambert was trying to tie the petitioner to
the crime because Mr. Lambert was upset that the petitioner had an
affair with Monica Lambert, Robert Lambert's wife. According to Mr.
Larsen, Mr. Lambert had been communicating with the petitioner to
arrange for him to pick up a woman in the Wal-Mart parking lot at a
certain date and time, so that the petitioner would be leaving WalMart at the same time that Mr. Lambert was leaving after robbing
the place, so that the police would believe it was the petitioner that
committed the robbery.
Mr. Larsen testified that during the criminal trial he mentioned the
affair between the petitioner and Monica Lambert during his
opening statement. When Mr. Lambert made the statement
regarding the petitioner attempting to rape Monica, Mr. Larsen did
not object. According to Mr. Larsen, he had already talked about
the affair to the jury and didn't want to draw any sort of attention to
the rape comment. Mr. Larsen felt the comment was flippant, and
unresponsive to Mr. Stevenson's question. Mr. Larsen also did not
want to argue about the statement in front of the jury. Because Mr.
Stevenson moved on quickly from the question, and from the
subject altogether, Mr. Larsen did not object. Mr. Larsen also
testified that he felt that Mr. Lambert's statement demonstrated that
he had a clear bias against the petitioner, which was
in line with Mr. Larsen's trial strategy. Mr. Larsen also elaborated on
his strategy, in general, not to object to every objectionable
statement. Mr. Larsen noted during past trials that jurors
expressed annoyance and disdain for attorneys who constantly
object during trial.
Mr. Larsen felt that a video Mr. Stevenson played for the jury during
the petitioner's criminal trial was determinative of the outcome of
the
case.
He
also
noted
the
significant
amount
of demonstrative evidence that came from the petitioner's cell
phone. The evidence revealed the petitioner's location prior to,
during, and after the robbery occurred, and also showed multiple
calls between the petitioner and his alleged co-defendants. Mr.
Larsen is of the opinion that the petitioner was not convicted due to
Mr. Lambert's comment about rape, because it was one
statement out of three days' worth of testimony.
As to Mr. Stevenson's alleged threat to Mr. Larsen, Mr. Larsen
testified that there was never any threat made to him or to his
career by Mr. Stevenson. On cross-examination by counsel for the
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petitioner, Mr. Larsen testified that he could not remember if he had
an application pending with Mr. Stevenson's office, and noted that
he was never hired for any position within that office.
Also on cross-examination, Mr. Larsen noted that he was aware
there were ways other than an objection to respond to Mr.
Lambert's statement. However, he did not feel such action
was necessary. Mr. Larsen noted that he was unable to find Monica
Lambert to testify at trial, and chose not to ask for a continuance of
the trial due to her absence. The court asked Mr. Larsen why he
didn't take the objection up outside the presence of the jury and Mr.
Larsen noted that the rape comment was nonresponsive and
demonstrated the witness's hatred of the petitioner, which was in
line with his case strategy.
Order, p. 5-7. (R. p. 79-80.)
Finally, the Order described the testimony of the prosecutor:
Lance Stevenson:
Mr. Stevenson testified that Mr. Larsen suggested during trial that
there was an affair between the petitioner and Monica
Lambert while Monica and Mr. Lambert were married. Mr.
Stevenson felt that Mr. Larsen made such a suggestion in an
attempt to discredit Mr. Lambert's testimony. In response, Mr.
Stevenson questioned Mr. Lambert on whether Mr. Lambert was
aware of the relationship between the petitioner and Monica, which
led to the statement at issue. Mr. Stevenson did not recall
seeing any obvious effect the statement had on the jury. Mr.
Stevenson testified that he had no doubt the jury would have found
the petitioner guilty whether Mr. Lambert made the statement or
not.
Mr. Stevenson denied making any threat to Mr. Larsen, and
testified that he did not believe Mr. Larsen had an application for a
job with his office.
The court inquired of Mr. Stevenson, and Mr. Stevenson testified
that, prior to the petitioner's criminal trial, he was not aware of the
defense's
theory
about
the
alleged
affair
between the petitioner and Monica Lambert. Mr. Stevenson was
only aware of a defense regarding the petitioner being at Wal-Mart
to meet a girl. Mr. Stevenson first became aware of the defense's
theory regarding the affair during Mr. Larsen's opening statement.
Mr. Stevenson testified that he did not believe that he spoke to Mr.
11

Lambert about the affair prior to Mr. Lambert's testimony, mostly
because he had no time to do so between Mr. Larsen's opening
statement and calling Mr. Lambert to the stand. Mr. Stevenson also
testified that he had no idea Mr. Lambert was going to mention
rape.
Order, p. 7-8. (R. p. 81-82.)
The Order then listed the following relevant findings of fact:
.
.
.
2. Mr. Larsen's theory of the criminal case was that Robert Lambert
was attempting to frame the petitioner for the robbery, and provide
untruthful testimony during the trial, because of a relationship the
petitioner had with Monica Lambert, Mr. Lambert's wife.
3. The petitioner and Mr. Larsen spoke about the trial strategy at
some point during trial preparations, and the petitioner knew about
the strategy. The sexual relationship between the petitioner and
Monica Lambert was part of the defense strategy. The petitioner
does not argue that this strategy was ineffective on the part of
counsel.
4. Mr. Larsen spoke about the affair between Ms. Lambert and the
petitioner during his opening statement and questioned Mr.
Lambert
about
the
affair
during
his
crossexamination of Mr. Lambert.
5. During the criminal trial, the witness Robert Lambert made a
statement during re-direct claiming the petitioner tried to rape
Monica Lambert, the only issue remaining for post-conviction relief.
6. Mr. Larsen did not object to the statement; move to strike the
statement or move for a mistrial in response to the statement. Mr.
Larsen testified in the evidentiary hearing as to why he did not
object or move to strike the statement or move for a mistrial. He
testified that it was a trial tactic based on prior experience and that
he did not want the jury to focus attention on that statement.
7. After Mr. Lambert made the statement, Mr. Stevenson did not
question Mr. Lambert any further on the subject, and the state did
not mention the rape allegation throughout the trial.
.

.
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.

9. Aside from the testimony of Mr. Lambert, a review of the trial
transcript demonstrates that there was substantial and competent
evidence and testimony to support the verdict and the conviction of
the petitioner. Video Surveillance placed the petitioner at the
location of the attempted robbery as well as the testimony of Wendi
Redman and Denise Osbourne. The trial evidence also included
phone records of telephone calls between the co-defendants,
including the petitioner and that such calls were made
contemporaneous to the crime.
10. The petitioner in his direct appeal did not assert or claim that
the verdict was not supported by substantial and competent
evidence or that the evidence presented by the state did not satisfy
the essential elements of the crime of which he was convicted.
Order, p. 8-10. (R. p. 82-84.)
The Order then listed the following relevant conclusions of law
regarding the failure to object:
.

.

.

4. Petitioner appears to argue that counsel's performance was
deficient for two reasons: (1) trial counsel's failure to object or move
to strike the statement regarding rape and (2) trial counsel's failure
to move for a mistrial.
5. First, as to petitioner's claim that his trial counsel's failure to
object to Mr. Lambert's statement regarding rape constitutes
deficient performance, failure to object to inadmissible evidence
may establish deficient performance, thereby satisfying the first
prong of the Strickland test. To begin the analysis, the first
determination is whether the statement in question would have
been admissible. During the evidentiary hearing on this petition the
state made no argument that the evidence would have been
admissible, therefore there is no dispute that statement in question
was inadmissible.
6. It is not unreasonable that trial counsel would choose not to
object to the statement, in order to keep the jury from focusing on
the statement. In fact, Mr. Larsen testified that he was well aware of
his ability to object to the statement in question and argue the
objection outside of the presence of the jury. However, he chose
instead to ignore the statement, in order to avoid drawing further
attention to the statement. Mr. Larsen testified that he chose not to
13

object to the statement because he did not want to call
attention to the substance of the statement. Such considerations
have been determined to be a tactical decision and not deficient
performance. Mr. Larsen also testified that he did not object to the
statement because it was not made in response to the question the
prosecutor had asked the witness, and the prosecutor did not allow
any further discussion on the topic, but instead quickly moved on
and finished his questioning of the witness.
7. Mr. Larsen testified that Mr. Lambert's statement was in line with
his trial strategy, that Mr. Lambert was trying to implicate the
petitioner. "[C]ounsel has broad discretion when formulating
strategy and tactics prior to and during trial." The court, on a
petition for post-conviction relief, will not "second-guess trial
counsel's decisions absent evidence of 'inadequate preparation,
ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of
objective evaluation."'
8. There has been no showing that Mr. Larsen was inadequately
prepared or that he lacked knowledge of the relevant law. Mr.
Larsen believed the statement reinforced his theory of
the case, that Mr. Lambert did not like the petitioner, and was trying
to frame him for a crime he did not commit. Trial strategy and
tactics will not be questioned without evidence of inadequate
preparation, ignorance of the law, or any shortcomings which are
capable of objective evaluation
9. The record indicates that trial counsel was well aware of his
options in response to Mr. Lambert's statement, and made a
strategic decision to ignore it and keep the focus from
the allegation against the petitioner, because Mr. Lambert's
statement supported the theory of the case. The petitioner
introduced
no
evidence
of
regarding
inadequate
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings
capable of objective evaluation. Therefore the presumption that
counsel's performance fell within the acceptable range of
professional assistance controls.
10. For these reasons, trial counsel's decision not to object to or
move to strike Mr. Lambert's statement, was not deficient and does
not satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test.
11. Counsel's failure to object to evidence deemed inadmissible
"does not automatically constitute ineffective assistance of counsel
-- the petitioner must still demonstrate a deficient performance that
prejudiced his or her defense."
14

12. While evidence of prior bad acts is inherently prejudicial, Mr.
Lambert's statement is not conclusive as to the petitioner's claim
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of his
criminal trial would have been different. In order to establish
prejudice, the petitioner must "show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different."
13. The petitioner has introduced no evidence to show that a
reasonable probability exists that the proceeding would have gone
differently if Mr. Larsen had objected to Mr. Lambert's statement.
The statement in question was an isolated remark, the content of
which was never discussed again throughout the trial. The
statement was also not in response to the question Mr. Stevenson
asked Mr. Lambert, and appears to have been an
offhand and isolated accusation. Mr. Stevenson did not ask any
follow up questions about any alleged rape, and did not mention the
statement during closing argument or otherwise. The petitioner
presented no evidence that the trial would have gone
differently, and did not testify on the topic. Further, the remark in
the context of this case was not necessarily inherently prejudicial
since the under lying crime for which the petitioner was on trial was
not a sex offense. The jury was already made aware by the
defense that the petitioner and Monica Lambert were engaged in
an adulterous affair. Because the offhand remark was not otherwise
emphasized at trial, and the statement was not relevant to the
crime charged, the petitioner has failed to prove that trial counsel's
failure to object to Mr. Lambert's statement amounted to deficient
performance and prejudiced the petitioner's defense.
Order, p. 10-14 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted). (R. p. 84-88.)
The Order then listed the following relevant conclusions of law regarding
the failure to make a motion for mistrial:
14. Second, as to petitioner's claim that his counsel was ineffective
for failing to move for a mistrial, the question is "...whether the
event which precipitated the motion to mistrial represented
reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record...[the]
focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that
triggered the mistrial motion." The standard for a motion for mistrial
was set forth in State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 197, 16 P.3d
288, 294 (Ct.App. 2000):
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[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge
reasonably exercised his discretion in light of circumstances
existing when the mistrial motion was made. Rather, the
question must be whether the event which precipitated the
motion for mistrial represented reversible error when viewed
in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion for
mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the 'abuse of
discretion' standard is a misnomer. The standard, more
accurately stated, is one of reversible error. Our focus is
upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that
triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to
declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident,
viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error.
15, "In a post-conviction proceeding challenging an attorney's
failure to pursue a motion in the underlying criminal action, the
court properly may consider the probability of success
of the motion in question in determining whether the attorney's
inactivity constituted incompetent performance." "Where the alleged
deficiency is counsel's failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the
motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by the trial court,
is generally determinative of both prongs of the Strickland test."
The petitioner has not argued or presented evidence as to how the
statement by Mr. Lambert was "reversible error".
16. Mr. Larsen's strategy during the petitioner's criminal trial was to
show that Mr. Lambert's testimony was fabricated or biased
because he was trying to implicate the defendant of committing the
crime. At the time Mr. Lambert made the statement, Mr.
Larsen had already introduced evidence of a relationship between
Ms. Lambert and the petitioner, both during his opening argument
and again during cross-examination of Mr. Lambert. There is no
evidence that the state knowingly offered any prejudicial evidence,
Mr. Lambert's comment was unresponsive to Mr. Stevenson's
question. Mr. Stevenson testified that he only questioned Mr.
Lambert on the relationship between Ms. Lambert and the
petitioner in response to Mr. Larsen's comments regarding the
relationship. In fact, other than the single question which elicited the
response at issue, the state never mentioned the relationship or the
alleged rape during trial or closing arguments. The
petitioner has presented no argument or evidence that the
statement had any continuing impact on the trial, or alleged
sufficient facts to establish that the motion would have
been granted if pursued, when considering the full record in context
with the statement. For these reasons trial counsel's failure to
move for a mistrial in this case did not prejudice the petitioner.
16

Order. p. 14-15 (internal citations omitted). (R. p. 88-89.)

D.

The Court Erred in Denying Post-Conviction Relief
Appellant asserts that the district court erred when it denied post-

conviction relief given the many erroneous points in its conclusions of law.
First and foremost, the district court is wrong as a matter of law when it
tries to soft pedal Lambert’s testimony that Mr. Bias had attempted to rape
Monica Lambert:
Further, the remark in the context of this case was not necessarily
inherently prejudicial since the under lying crime for which the
petitioner was on trial was not a sex offense.
Order, p. 13-14. (R. p. 87-88.)
Contrary to this conclusion of law, the Court of Appeals has already found
404(b) evidence to be inherently prejudicial generally, and has specifically found
it highly prejudicial in this very case. In the previous appeal, the Court of Appeals
stated the following regarding the rape allegation:
Regarding the second prong of the Strickland analysis, Bias must
still show that he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's
deficiency. Sheahan, 146 Idaho at 105, 190 P.3d at 924. In his
petition, Bias contended that the statement "was highly prejudicial"
and "inflammatory." We agree, as we have previously held that
I.R.E. 404(b) evidence is inherently prejudicial. See, e.g., State v.
Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 221, 207 P.3d 186, 197 (Ct. App. 2009).
Bias v. State, 159 Idaho at 704.
In addition to being controlling as precedent as to 404(b) evidence being
inherently prejudicial, the Court of Appeals’ determination that the statement was

17

highly prejudicial to Mr. Bias is also the law of the case which must be applied by
the district court upon remand.
Further, the district court’s statement about the underlying crime not being
a sex offense shows a misunderstanding of the problems with other bad acts
evidence. Other bad acts evidence is excluded because the jury may use it to
determine the defendant’s propensity to commit similar crimes, but also it can be
used to determine the defendant’s propensity to commit crimes in general or his
bad character.
In other words, here, the prejudice to Mr. Bias in this case is the jury
would be more likely to convict Mr. Bias of conspiracy to commit robbery if it
thought he was a criminal generally or more specifically, thought he was a rapist
or attempted rapist. Moreover, a problem overlooked by the district court is that
Mr. Bias testified in his own defense. The jury of course was evaluating his
credibility based on what it knew about him. And because his counsel did not
object or move to strike,

this included a claim that he attempted to rape a

woman. This is why defense counsel’s claim that he did not object because the
jury had already heard about the affair makes no sense and, quite frankly, strains
credulity. There is a world of difference between rape and adultery. Rape is
generally considered to be one of the most despicable crimes. Adultery on the
other hand, is presumably not even a prosecuted offense anymore.
The court also makes much out of what it claims was an unresponsive
answer by the witness. Actually, the answer was perfectly responsive. Lambert
had already denied knowledge of the affair on cross examination and the
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prosecutor was directly asking him why he was so sure there was no affair. In
other words, the prosecutor asked an open ended “why” question and just
because he did not expect that answer does not somehow make it unresponsive
or less prejudicial to Petitioner. Further, it means nothing that the prosecution did
not follow up on the statement since everyone agrees it was inadmissible.
Another thing that does not make sense is trial counsel’s claim that he did
not object because he did not want to draw any more attention to the statement.
This does not explain why he did not object and/or argue the objection outside
the presence of the jury. Likewise, even if he believed that frequent objections
antagonized juries, he was not objecting frequently and an adverse jury reaction
to a successful objection to this inadmissible evidence seems unlikely.
Regarding the failure to bring a motion for mistrial, it could have been
argued outside the jury’s presence as well. Even if defense counsel really
believed the rape allegation was in line with his theory of the case, it was still
inadmissible and prejudicial to Mr. Bias and a mistrial was still a correct remedy.
Again, ignored by the district court was the fact that the rape claim colored the
jury’s view of Mr. Bias’ testimony and prevented his effective defense via his own
testimony.
Finally, defense counsel did not remember if he had an application in with
the prosecutor’s office but pointed out he did not work in that office. This does
not controvert Mr. Bias’ memory that he did have an application in and further, at
the evidentiary hearing, the former defense attorney was currently a chief deputy
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prosecutor in another county. (Tr. p. 20.)

Thus, he has applied to be a

prosecutor in at least one prosecuting attorney’s office.
Accordingly, the district court erred in denying post-conviction relief based
on a failure to object and/or a failure to move for a mistrial when inadmissible and
highly prejudicial evidence was admitted which also acted to impeach Mr. Bias’
right to testify.

CONCLUSION
Wherefore, for the reasons as stated above, Appellant/Petitioner
respectfully requests that the district court’s denial of post-conviction relief be
reversed and that Mr. Bias’ conviction be vacated.
DATED this 27th day of November, 2017.
/s/ Greg S. Silvey
Greg S. Silvey
Attorney for Appellant
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